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ABSTRACT 
The Covid-19 epidemic highlighted the significance of externalities: contacts with other 
people do not only affect our chances of getting infected but also our entire network. 
We introduce a model for coalitional network stability in networks with widespread 
externalities. The network function form generalises the partition function form of 
cooperative games in allowing the network structure to be taken into account. The 
recursive core for network function form games generalises the recursive core for such 
environments and its properties also rhyme with the corresponding inclusion 
properties of the optimistic and pessimistic recursive cores and can be seen as a 
modification of pairwise stability to a coalitional setting where the involvement of more 
players allows for the -- partial -- internalisation of the externalities, but we also allow 
residual players to endogenously respond to any externalities that may affect them. We 
present two simple examples to illustrate positive and negative externalities. The first 
is of a favour network and show that the core is nonempty when players must pay 
transfers to intermediaries; this simple setting also models economic situations such 
as airline networks. The second models social contacts during an epidemic and finds 
social bubbles as the solution. 
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Mag-stabilitás széleskörűen externáliás hálózatokon 
KÓCZY Á. LÁSZLÓ 
ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ 
A Covid-19 járvány mindenki számára világossá tette az externáliák jelentőségét: a 
másokkal való érintkezés nem csak a fertőzési esélyünket növeli, de egész 
környezetünkét. Bevezetünk egy koalíciós hálózati stabilitási modellt a széleskörűen 
externáliás hálózatokra. A hálózati függvény alak a partíciós függvény alak 
általánosítása ahol lehetővé tesszük a hálózati struktúra figyelembevételét is.  A 
hálózati függvény alakra definiált rekurzív mag a partíciós függvény alakú játékokra 
megadott változat általánosítása és ennek megfelelően a tulajdonságai is rímelnek az 
optimista és pesszimista rekurzív magok részhalmaz-tulajdonságaira. Tekinthető 
ugyanakkor a páronkénti stabilitás koalíciós általánosításának is, ahol a több játékos 
részvétele lehetővé teszi az externáliák – legalább részleges – internalizációját, de mi a 
maradékjátékosoknak is megengedjük az endogén reakciót az őket érő externáliákra. 
Két egyszerű példával mutatjuk be a pozitív és negatív externáliákat. Az első egy 
szívességi hálózat, ahol megmutatjuk, hogy a mag akkor nemüres, ha a játékosok 
fizetnek a közvetítőknek; ez az egyszerű modell olyan gazdasági helyzetek leírására is 
alkalmas, mint például a légitársaság-hálózatok. A második egy járvány idején 
fenntartott társasági kapcsolatokat modellez és megállapítjuk, hogy megoldásként 
közösségi buborékok jönnek létre.  
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The Covid-19 epidemic highlighted the significance of externalities:
contacts with other people do not only affect our chances of getting
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tional network stability in networks with widespread externalities. The
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1 Introduction
Networks are used to describe a wide class of social and economic situations.
In a social network the nodes are individuals, and the edges or links may be
trading possibilities (Corominas-Bosch, 2004) channels of information and
monetary transfers in an informal insurance setting (Bloch et al., 2008),
but we may also think of physical networks, such as road or telecommuni-
cation networks (Altman et al., 2006; Roughgarden, 2007). Csercsik and
Ko´czy (2017) describe a network where the edges are power lines connecting
power stations and consumers. The task to form balancing groups (where
production equals consumption) naturally leads to a cooperative game over
the given network. In practice, however, the players do not only use the
network, but participate in its maintenance, initiate projects to build new
or eliminate old, not needed connections. Our contribution is a new model
where the endogeneity of the network is explicitly addressed.
Since Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) we are especially interested in the
emergence of stable networks, networks that persist. In this seminal paper
stability is driven by the persistence of links: while any player can refuse to
maintain a link and thus any player can severe a link, only pairs of players
can build new links. This leads to the natural concept of pairwise stability.
This concept defines a wide class of stable networks. While these networks
are immune to changes by single players or pairs, pairwise stability does
not check for possible deviations by larger groups. Dutta and Mutuswami
(1997); Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) consider strong Nash equi-
libria (Aumann, 1959), where players are permitted to make coordinated,
but noncooperative deviations. Such stable networks are very difficult to
find, indeed strong Nash equilibria are rather rare and so several alternative
models have been proposed. In the noncooperative setting one must very
clearly specify the players’ strategies and their abilities to change them. For
instance, Calvo´-Armengol and I˙lkılıc¸ (2008) consider the relation of equi-
libria under single link building and multilink severance. A cooperative
approach allows to step over this issue. Ju (2013) considers coalitional co-
operation in networks, but there the networks are exogenous and the means
of cooperation are somewhat more limited. Ours is a general, cooperative
approach.
Another problem is the seemingly inherent conflict between stability and
efficiency. Already Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) find this conflict: unless we
insist on such an extreme allocation rule as the egalitarian there does not, in
general, exist a network that is both stable and efficient. The conflict is due
to the conflict between the parties forming the link on the one hand and the
externalities generated by those links to the rest of the network. Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) assume that there are costs to forming links, but there
are widespread benefits of being better connected. Morrill (2010) assumes
that a new relationship is beneficial to the parties, but that the new connec-
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tion may harm the rest of the network. The case of an employment network
is cited, where acquaintances help players to new jobs, but the value of a
connection depends on its exclusivity; the co-author network of Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) is another perfect example. Mo¨hlmeier, Rusinowska, and
Tanimura (2016) combine the connection model with the co-author model
allowing for positive externalities of link formation via the connections it
provides, while increasing the congestion at the end nodes creating negative
externalities at the neighbours. Buechel and Hellmann (2012) show that
positive externalities may lead to under-connected, while negative external-
ities to over-connected stable networks (with both terms formally defined).
We take a different, purely cooperative approach, where coalitional improve-
ments are possible: a coalition can freely rearrange its internal structure of
connections and may also jointly optimise the connections to other players.
As a special case, deviations by the grand coalition correspond to Pareto-
improvements therefore stability implies efficiency. This is different from a
number of models where focus is on the allocation of the benefits of a given
network (Park and Ju, 2016).
While coalitional deviations are also accounted for under strong stability,
there is a fundamental difference between cooperative and noncooperative
deviations. Under strong stability coalitional deviations are unilateral and
simultaneous. Our cooperative approach is based on the core. The core is
a static concept: when a core allocation is proposed, it is accepted by all
without protest. On the other hand, deviations from a non-core proposal
are modelled in a dynamic way. If the proposal on the table does not meet
the expectations or demands of one of the coalitions, it makes a threat of
leaving the full cooperation if its demands cannot be met. If the threat
works, the original proposal is abandoned, and a new one is made. If the
threat does not work, the coalition in question leaves the joint agreement
and begins to act according to its own interests. Due to the externalities its
value will depend on the network structure the remaining players form.
The structure of the paper is, accordingly, the following. First we in-
troduce the general notation, introduce the game form we use to model the
coalitional network games and recall the recursive core that inspires the so-
lution concept that is introduced in the next section. We study two simple
networks at length, determine the stable structures and discuss their possible
applications.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The outline of the model
We consider a cooperative game over a network. Players can build or cancel
links, and the coalitional payoffs depend explicitly on the graph, as well as
the coalition structure. Our notion of coalition stability is based on the
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idea of the (coalition structure) core. When some coalitions deviate from
the current structure they can (i) arbitrarily restructure internal links, (ii)
severe any outgoing links (iii) propose new outgoing links and (iv) allocate
the value of the coalition among its members. The value of the coalition can
of course only be determined once the entire graph is known so we determine
the structure of the remaining, residual players.
There are several possible approaches to take. By considering strong
Nash equilibria Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) essentially assume that the
structure remains unchanged. This is, however, not very likely given the
widespread externalities present in the network: the deviation will change
the payoff of the remaining players, who will react to the externalities in a
complex way: they might form coalitions who also optimise their internal
structure as well as choose the outgoing links they want to have or keep.
The value of the deviating coalition will, in turn, also depend on the reaction
chosen by the residual players so it is natural to take a conservative approach
and expect the worst: if the the deviation is profitable in the worst case, it
is surely profitable.
While this approach is very conservative from the viewpoint of the devi-
ating players, the resulting set of coalitionally stable networks may include
networks that only appear stable because of this assumption of extreme
pessimism. In other words, extreme pessimism corresponds to extreme op-
timism regarding stability. More importantly, this approach ignores the
interests of the residual players. So, along the lines of the recursive core
(Ko´czy, 2007) we assume that the residual players play a similar game and
pessimism is applied only to the resulting, often unique coalitionally stable
network or rather the payoffs induced by these residual structures.
We do not assume that the deviating coalition breaks all ties with the
rest. The residual problem may therefore contain some outgoing links: these
links can be broken, but no new outgoing links can be built. The latter
follows from the fact that this would require mutual consent, that is, end-
points belonging to the same coalition. The outgoing links will be formally
connecting to an artificial, non-strategic player 0 representing the outside
world; when a set of players leaves the game, the links to this set are sim-
ply remapped to end at 0. A player may have links to more than one of
the deviating players and these links may have very different implications
therefore we keep all of these. As a result there may be multiple links to
the outside world requiring us to use somewhat more general notation. This
more general notation, on the other hand, permits us to consider rather
general problems. For instance, in the case of a power network the different
parallel arcs may be power lines with different transmission capacities and
solving this game may determine not only where the lines should be built,
but also what their capacities should be. In the case of an existing line an
upgrade could be modelled likewise.
Now we move on to the formal model of this graph.
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2.2 Formal model
Let N denote the finite set of players, 2N the set of all subsets, called
coalitions, and gN the set of all subsets of size 2. For a set S let S denote its
complement N \S. Π denotes the set of partitions of N into non-overlapping
subsets, partitions of S ⊆ N are denoted Π(S). An embedded coalition is
a pair (C,P) such that C is a coalition, P is a partition and C ∈ P. The
set of embedded coalitions is denoted by E . Let G = {g ∣∣g ⊆ gN } denote
the set of all possible graphs over N . It is common to define the value of
a network as v : G −→ R. Such a network, however allows no multiple or
open links.
Let N0 = {0} ∪ N denote the set of players including a non-strategic
player representing the outside world. G0 is defined similarly to G. We
then define the set of (feasible) links L. There is a well-defined mapping
e : L −→ G20, where e(l) is simply the set of endpoints of l ∈ L, but
e(k) = e(l) does not imply k = l. In other words the links in L have names
– to identify multilinks between two players. We call (N,L) or L an open
multigraph or shortly graph. In this setup nodes i and j are connected by a
link if there exists l ∈ L such that e(l) = {i, j}. It will not lead to confusion
if we just say that ij ∈ L. We say that pi = {lk}mk=1 is a path of length m
and the distance between nodes i and j, denoted s(i, j) is simply the length
m of the shortest path with i ∈ e(l1) and j ∈ e(lm).
We define the value of a coalition of players in a network by the network
function
V : E × 2L −→ R. (2.1)
This function assigns a real value to each coalition in a network, a value
V (C,P, `) to each coalition C embedded in partition P given a network
` ⊆ L.
The triple (N,L, V ) is a cooperative game in network form or simply
a game. We call a triple ω = (x,P, `) consisting of a payoff vector x, a
partition P and ` ∈ L an outcome if it satisfies the following:∑
i∈C
xi =
∑
i∈C
Vi(C,P, `),
for all C ∈ P, in other words transfers are permitted among players coali-
tions.
Let us denote the set of outcomes in (N,L, V ) by Ω(N,L, V ). The aim
of this paper is to find the outcomes that cannot be improved upon by any
coalition of players including the grand coalition.
2.3 The recursive core
Before we move to the definition of the core for games in network form, first
recall the recursive core for partition function form games.
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In a partition function form game (see Ko´czy, 2018, for a recent survey)
whether a coalition benefits from deviating depends on the induced partition
of the players. The α−core (Aumann and Peleg, 1960) assumes that a
coalition deviates only if it gets a higher payoff irrespective of the induced
partition, so the deviation must be profitable even under the most adverse
conditions. The core stability (Shenoy, 1979) is more permissive: a coalition
deviates if any of the induced partitions gives a higher payoff. In the γ-
core (Chander and Tulkens, 1997) the coalition must face individually best
responses. Here we recall the concept of the recursive core (Ko´czy, 2007,
2009), that allows the remaining, residual players to freely react and form a
core-stable partition before the payoff of the deviating coalition is evaluated.
First we define the residual game over the set R ( N . Assume R = N \R
have formed R ∈ Π(R). Then the residual game (R, VR) is the partition
function form game over the player set R with the partition function given
by VR(C,R) = V (C,R∪R).
Definition 1 (Recursive core (Ko´czy, 2007)). For a single-player game
the recursive core is trivially defined. Now assume that the recursive core
C(N,V ) has been defined for all games with |N | < k players. We call a
pair ω = (x,P) consisting of a payoff vector and a partition P ∈ Π(N)
an outcome. Let us denote the the set of outcomes in (N,V ) by Ω(N,V ).
Then for an |N |-player game an outcome (x,P) is dominated if there exists
a coalition Q forming partition Q and an outcome (y,Q ∪ Q) ∈ Ω(N,V ),
such that yQ > xQ and if C(Q,VQ) 6= ∅ then (yQ,Q) ∈ C(Q,VQ). The
recursive core C(N,V ) of (N,V ) is the set of undominated outcomes.
The recursive core is well-defined, though it may be empty.
3 The recursive core for games in network func-
tion form
Our new coalitional stability concept is introduced in this section. The main
lines of this concept are similar to those of the recursive core except that the
payoff of players or coalitions is , but the more general game requires some
more complex notation and terminology. First we present this notation,
as before, we define the way to derive a residual network game and finally
present the recursive core for network games.
3.1 Residual games
Now assume that a coalition R has left the game forming partition R and
structure `R ⊆ LR, where LR =
{
l
∣∣l ∈ L, e(l) ∩R 6= ∅} is the restriction of
the set of feasible links to R. Recall that `R contains arcs within R∪{0}, but
also arcs that lead to the remaining players in R. Depending on the choice of
6
players inR some of these existing, or proposed will be abandoned, some may
be accepted or maintained. Likewise the consequence of having an outside
link from R will depend on the interest at the other end in maintaining this
connection. Since this interest is already known, knowing `R it is possible
to calculate the effect simply by knowing the choices in R Indeed, given
these decisions the problem the remaining players in R face is similar to
the original game: it is also a game in network function form, just a little
smaller one. In the following we define this residual game.
The residual game is a triple (R,LR, VR) =
(
R,LR, V
`R,R
R
)
where V
`R,R
R
is the network function of this smaller game. While this is a network function
on its own, like any other network function we derive it from the original
network function, by re-merging the residual game with the players who
have already quit, using the information (partition, network structure) we
already know about them.
The set of players is simply the union of the two sets of players. The
same applies to partitions.
Merging the network structures is a little more complicated. A re-merged
structure consists of all the links that the two structures contain with the
exception of those connecting links in LR,R that have been proposed on one
side and not on the other.
(`R, `R) =
(
(`R ∪ `R) \ LR,R
)
∪ `R,R, (3.1)
where `R,R = `R ∩ `R ⊆ LR,R.
Then we can define the network function for the residual game
V
`R,R
R (C,PR, `R) = V (C,PR ∪R, (`R, `R)). (3.2)
3.2 The recursive core
Now we can define the recursive core for network function form games. The
definition is analogous to that for partition function form games and is
therefore recursive. First the core is defined for a trivial, single player game.
Assuming the definition for all, at most k − 1 player games, we extend the
definition to k player games.
Definition 2 (Recursive core for network games). For a single-player game
the recursive core is trivially defined.
Now assume that the recursive core C(N,L, V ) has been defined for all
games with |N | < k players and consider an |N |-player game (N,L, V ).
We say that the outcome (x,P, `) is dominated if there exists a coalition
Q forming partition Q with network structure `Q and yQ such that for all
outcomes
(
(yQ, yQ),Q∪Q, (`Q, `Q)
)
∈ Ω(N,L, V ) satisfying
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• (yQ,Q, `Q) ∈ C
(
Q,L
`Q
Q
, V
`Q
Q
,Q
)
if this core is nonempty, or
• (yQ,Q, `Q) ∈ Ω
(
Q,L
`Q
Q
, V
`Q
Q
,Q
)
otherwise
we have yQ > xQ. The recursive core C(N,L, V ) of (N,L, V ) is the set of
undominated outcomes.
In the terminology of Ko´czy (2007) this is the pessimistic version, where
pessimism is on the part of the deviating players. There is a correspond-
ing version with optimistic players, where it is sufficient if the deviation
is profitable for any (thus not all) of the residual (core) outcomes. It is
easy to verify that the optimistic recursive core is weakly contained in the
pessimistic recursive core.
Note that the elements of the core are always Pareto efficient: Pareto
inefficient outcomes are dominated via a deviation of some partition of N .
3.3 Relation to other network formation models
In a seminal paper on network formation Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) intro-
duced pairwise stability. A network is pairwise stable if (1) no unconnected
pair benefits from linking up and (2) no player benefits from deleting an
existing connection.
This model is a special case of our model in the sense that the equilibrium
is driven by pairs: this corresponds to a game where only pairs have positive
values. Larger coalitions are either worthless or create no greater demands
than the pairs within implying a balancedness condition for each coalition.
Pairwise stability, on the other hand, is a fundamentally noncooperative
equilibrium concept as a slightly modified version is presented by Bloch and
Jackson (2007) makes it even clearer. In such games there is no discussion
about possible reactions as the decisions are made simultaneously. In our
model players are more farsighted calculating with the reaction of other
players. This aspect makes the two sets of solutions or equilibria mutually
non-inclusive in general and applies to most of the network models (Bloch
and Jackson, 2006), although for special classes of games one or the other
may be more permissive.
In order to illustrate the differences, we present the following simple
example with 4 nodes.
Example 1. In a connections game players benefit from being connected to
each other. A connection may be direct or indirect, but indirect connections
are less valuable. It is costly to be connected and the cost of the connection
depends on the distance. The four nodes are located at the corners of an
elongated rectangle where the short connections cost 8, long connections
cost 16. The benefit of a direct connection is 4, an indirect with a single
stop is 3 and with two stops is 2.
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Immediately note that an empty network is pairwise stable, since there
are no (strict) incentives to form links. If we would consider this to be a
game of network formation, this would be the end of the story. But this
would not be the end of the difficulties.
Suppose now that the two pairs of close nodes are connected and are
considering to link up. Would this connection be built? The benefit of the
two players involved is a direct and a 1-stop connection, valued 7, while
at least one of them would have to contribute at least 8 to establish the
connection so the link is not profitable. They, of course, do not take the
positive externalities generated into account. With coalitions we can bring
all the benefited parties on board. It is already sufficient to consider a trio.
It is easy to see that the fourth player will keep its connection. Then the
coalition has 5 direct, 3 one-stop and 1 two-stop connections and must pay
a long, and 1.5 short connections, so the payoff is 3. This may seem low,
but ex ante, the payoff was 0.
Now consider another case. Let 1 and 2 be one pair, 3 and 4 another
and assume that the (long) arcs 1-3 and 2-4 as well as the short arc 3-4
are present. Should the coalition {1, 2} build the arc 1-2 or not? Assuming
that there are no transfers initially, the payoff of this coalition is 2. When
it deviates, the remaining players respond as a coalition (this is a weakly
dominant strategy in this game); they can break arcs 1-3, 2-4 and 3-4. It
can be shown that they will not break 3-4; they can break no, one or both
long arcs. Pairwise stability assumes that the rest of the network does not
react, which corresponds to the case when no arcs are broken. In this case
both the deviating and the residual coalition has 4 direct and 2 one-stop
connections and pays for a sort and two half long arcs, giving a payoff of
16+6-24=-2. Under pairwise stability the link 1-2 would not be built. It
turns out, however, that the residual coalition prefers to keep only 1 long
arc. In this (once again symmetric) case both coalitions have 3 direct, 2
one-stop and 1 two-stop connections and pay for 1 short and a half long
arc, giving a payoff of 12+6+2-16=4. This is not only higher than previous
figure, but is also better than the initial payoff of 2, so the coalition will
build the arc in question.
Note that the coalition {1, 2} could have alternatively severed one of the
long arcs themselves but the threat that the residual coalition removes the
other long arc (giving a payoff 0) is still there.
4 Implementation
The stability concept described here is not the simplest one. We believe
it addresses an existing problem that has not been solved before, but soon
there may be other, potentially simpler ways to approach it. Why would
anyone bother working with our core concept? The standard approach to
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support cooperative solution concepts is either to show that over a broad
class of possible solutions this uniquely satisfies a handful of elementary
properties – we do not have such an axiomatisation for the core of network
function form games – or to present a natural noncooperative game whose
equilibria reproduce our solution. Noncooperative games are highly imprac-
tical for games with more than a handful players, but the more explicit and
transparent rules make people trust them more. If we get the same solution
with “hands are on the table” it is OK to use the equivalent cooperative
formulation. We take this second path and modify the implementation of
the recursive core for partition function form games (Ko´czy, 2015) to obtain
the corresponding result.
In this model players can make proposals in continuous time. A proposal
addresses a subset of the players and specifies their partition, the shares
each player will get from the coalitions’ payoffs and the network structure,
both internal and outgoing. If each addressed player accepts the proposal,
then they leave the game and implement the proposal. Otherwise another
proposal is made and this automatically cancels the previous one. The game
ends if all players have left, but it may or may not end. Players also get
payoffs in this latter case.
The focus is on stationary strategies and we will look at subgame con-
sistent strategies (Ko´czy, 2015), where subgame perfectness is only required
around the equilibrium path, while irrelevant subgames are ignored.
4.1 Strategies
Consider a game (N,V ) with a player set N and a network function V .
Time t is continuous, players can act at any time, but we assume that there
is always an open time interval between two actions allowing players to
intervene if necessary.
During the game players make proposals to form coalitions and when
such a proposal is accepted the accepting parties leave the game and become
inactive. Initially all players are active, but let us consider a more general,
later stage, when some players have already left: Let Qt ⊆ N , Qt and `tQ
respectively denote the set of quitted players by time t, the partition and
network they have formed – including some links to players in Qt that are
subject to approval yet. In such a case a player i can make proposal that
specifies both the coalitions, the network structure and the payoff allocation
within the coalitions. Formally a proposal is
P ti =
(Pt, `t, wt)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pt ∈ Π(P t), P t ⊆ Qt, P t 3 i,
`t ∈ LP t , wt ∈ RP
t
, ∀P tk ∈ Pt
∑
j∈P tk
wtj = 1

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the current proposer is it making the proposal pt = (Pt, `t, wt) to the players
in P t, already accepted by the players in At ⊆ P t (we assume it ∈ At) have
already accepted the proposal. At t a player i can
1. accept the current proposal pt if i ∈ P t,
2. make a new proposal, or
3. do nothing.
The strategy σi of a player i specifies a complete protocol of actions for
all times and contingencies during the game and σti the action at t. Let σ
denote the strategy profile collecting the strategies of all players.
History h is a complete record of events, represented by the sequence{
stk
}
k
of states st = (Qt, `tQ, it, pt, At) at times t = tk where the state of the
game has changed. Subgames are identified with history truncations ht; let
σ|ht denote the restriction of strategy σ to the subgame ht.
4.2 Payoffs
Only players who leave the game may obtain payoffs; their payoff is deter-
mined conservatively in case some players remain in the game for ever:
V (Qk,Q, `Q) =
{
min {V (Qk,P, `) |P ⊃ Q, ` ⊃ `Q } Qk ∈ Q
0 otherwise.
(4.1)
Given a strategy profile σ the continuation payoff of player i is xi(σ).
4.3 Alternative histories
In a cooperative game stability is taken care of by the threat of a residual
response that makes a deviation non-profitable. If the residual core supports
multiple partitions and network configurations this response is nontrivial,
and it is not always preferred by all residual players. Still, the pessimism of
the deviating coalitions makes them focus on these reactions.
In the noncooperative game the situation is a little different, especially
if we focus on stationary strategies. Players playing stationary strategies
cannot condition their actions on past events of the game, they effectively
do not remember what happened. In our model the active players agree
on some history and base their actions thereon. This alternative history is
a good explanation of the set of players who have left, their partition and
network structure, but is not necessarily true. By basing their strategies on
this alternative history active players will occasionally get the reaction right
and successfully punish deviators.
Given the current state s, players make up one of the possible histories
h(s) satisfying sh
t(s) = s for some t. Let H(s) =
{
h
∣∣∣∃t : sht = s} denote
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the set of plausible histories to the current state s. When the partition Qt
changes the current history is abandoned and a totally new history is made
up, possibly not containing s at all. Let H(σ) denote the set of all possible
histories as σ is played and let H(σ, s) ⊆ H(σ) ∩H(s) denote those passing
through s.
Individual payoffs are also affected by the alternative histories. Let
x(σ, h) ∈ RN denote the vector of payoffs in case σ is played along the
history h. Players consider all possible histories and evaluate them conser-
vatively to foresee individual payoffs according to
x(σ, s) = min
h∈H(σ,s)
x(σ, h). (4.2)
Note the pessimism of the players. When uncertain about the subsequent
development of the game, they assume that the remaining players will fabri-
cate histories that are the least favourable to them. While subgame perfect-
ness can be formulated with these expectations, too, the resulting equilibria
are different in general. Since the additional “information” comes from the
past, the concepts of stationarity and stationary equilibria are not affected,
the stationary equilibria remain the same and the recursive core equivalence
result remains valid. Likewise, subgame consistency can be redefined in this
environment, but we first clarify what is a relevant subgame.
4.4 Equilibria
Once the game is defined we clarify what is meant under equilibrium be-
haviour in this game. We look at stationary subgame consistent equilibria
(Ko´czy, 2015), a solution more inclusive than subgame-perfectness by ignor-
ing subgames that are never reached, but one avoiding the folk-theorem like
results of equilibria permitting nonstationary strategies. In the following we
define these terms formally.
Definition 3 (Relevant subgame). The original game is relevant. Given a
strategy σ nontrivial subgame of a relevant subgame is relevant if it can be
reached by an elementary profitable deviation σ′ producing Q′ and `′:
xi(σ, s
ht) < xi(σ
′,Q′, `′,∅), (4.3)
Let σ|h denote the truncation of σ to the subgame corresponding to h.
Definition 4. The strategy profile σ∗ is a subgame-consistent equilibrium if
for all relevant subgames ht, i ∈ N , strategies σi the corresponding restric-
tions σ∗|ht and σi|ht to ht we have
xi(σ
∗|ht) ≥ xi(σi|ht , σ∗−i|ht). (4.4)
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For an equilibrium strategy profile, this requires checking the equilibrium
path only: Since no profitable deviation exist, other subgames need not be
checked. Were there profitable deviations they would have to be supported
by a strategy that is subgame perfect along that strategy.
Clearly, subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are also subgame-consistent.
Definition 5. A strategy σ is stationary if it does not depend on time.
Formally: if for all h and t1, t2 with h
t1 = ht2 we have σ|ht1 = σ|ht2 .
We study stationary subgame-consistent equilibria.
The subgame-consistency is accordingly modified replacing h by an arbi-
trary (compatible) history h(s) in Inequality 4.4 and payoffs are now given
by Equation 4.2 and are conditional on the current s via the different up-
dates of made-up history.
xi(σ
∗|ht(s), s) ≥ xi(σi|ht(s), σ∗−i|ht(s), s). (4.5)
The condition becomes clear now: it has implications not so much for
the present, but for the reactions of the remaining players.
Let σ be a stationary strategy and σ|s its restriction to a state s.
A stationary consistent equilibrium σ∗ is a strategy profile that is both
subgame-consistent and stationary, that is, if for all relevant subgames cor-
responding to some s we have
xi(σ
∗|s, s) ≥ xi(σi|s, σ∗−i|s, s). (4.6)
4.5 Theorem
In the following we present our implementation result and its proof.
Let SCE(N,L, V ) denote the set of stationary consistent equilibria and
Ω∗(N,L, V ) the outcomes resulting from playing such equilibrium strategies.
Theorem 1. For a given network function form game (N,L, V ) we have
C(N,L, V ) = Ω∗(N,L, V ). (4.7)
The proof is by induction using a number of auxiliary results.
Lemma 2. Assume that Theorem 1 holds for all network function form
games with up to k − 1 players. Then for all games with |N | = k
C(N,L, V ) ⊇ Ω∗(N,L, V ). (4.8)
Proof. Either Ω∗(N,V ) = ∅ and the result is trivial, or there exists a sta-
tionary consistent equilibrium σ producing ω(σ, h) = (x(σ, h),P(σ, h), `(σ, h))
such that ω(σ, h) ∈ Ω∗(N,L, V ) for some sequence of possible histories
h ∈ H(σ,∅). We assume that ω(σ, h) 6∈ C(N,L, V ) and prove contradiction.
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If ω(σ, h) 6∈ C(N,L, V ) then there exists a profitable deviation D, ` by
some set D of players in the cooperative game. Let us see the corresponding
part of the noncooperative game. Assume that the same partition and net-
work structure is proposed. Supposed this proposal is accepted: the players
in D leave the game and we get to a new subgame with fewer players. This
subgame cannot be irrelevant: for an irrelevant subgame the deviation can
never be profitable and irrespective of the expectations of the players there,
this extends to the cooperative game, too. Therefore the subgame must
be relevant. By the existence of a stationary consistent σ, however, there
exist stationary consistent strategies in this subgame. The subgame has less
than k players, so by assumption the corresponding residual core and the set
of stationary consistent equilibrium outcomes coincide. Since σ is a SCE,
its restriction σ|s to this relevant subgame s is stationary consistent, too.
Moreover the deviation from σ to form D is not profitable, therefore
xD(σ|s, s) ≥ xD(σ′|s′ , s′) (4.9)
On the other hand, by the inductive assumption,
ω(σ′|s′ , s′) ∈ C(D,LD, V `D,D). (4.10)
This, however, implies that the deviation D is not profitable in the cooper-
ative game; contradiction.
Lemma 3. If Theorem 1 holds for all games with up to k−1 players. Then
for all games with |N | = k
C(N,L, V ) ⊆ Ω∗(N,L, V ).
Proof. In this constructive proof inspired by Bloch (1996) we show that if
(x∗,P∗, `∗) ∈ C(N,L, V ) there exists a stationary consistent strategy profile
σ∗ such that for all for all possible histories h ∈ H(σ∗,∅) we have ω(σ∗, h) ∈
C(N,L, V ).
Consider the following strategy to implement (x∗,P∗, `∗)
1. At the beginning of the game propose to form the equilibrium parti-
tion, network and the corresponding (proportional) payoff distribution.
2. Accept the equilibrium proposal.
3. Accept proposals where the continuation payoff is higher than x∗.
4. Punish deviations by a (counter)proposal on the basis of the alterna-
tive history in every other case.
What do we mean by such a punishment? By the assumption that (x∗,P∗, `∗)
belongs to the core no deviation is profitable. This means that for each devi-
ation there exists a residual behaviour that (1) harms some of the deviating
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players and (2) belongs to the residual core if this is not empty. Let us first
look at the case when the residual core is not empty. By our assumption
about the coincidence of the residual core and stationary consistent equi-
librium outcomes this is an equilibrium behaviour – maybe not the only
subgame-consistent equilibrium, but we will focus on this equilibrium. The
same equivalence result implies that if the residual core is empty, no sta-
tionary consistent equilibria exist in this subgame. In such subgames no
proposal gets accepted, players stay in the game forever and obtain a payoff
of 0. Players could obtain higher payoffs, but
σ∗i (Q, Q˜, T , w) =

(
P∗, x∗|x∗|
)
if T = Q = ∅(
Q(Q˜), xQ(Q˜)|xQ(Q˜)|
)
if T = ∅, but Q 6= ∅
accept if xi(σ
∗,Q∪ T ,∅) > xi(σ∗,Q,∅)
wait otherwise.
(4.11)
In equilibrium P(σ∗) = P∗ and the strategy is stationary by construction
so we only need to verify subgame-consistency. We show this by induction.
As subgame-consistency holds for a trivial game we may assume that it holds
for all games of size less than |N |.
Now consider game (N,V ) and observe that if Q departed to form Q the
subgame is simply a coalition formation game with less players. We discuss
two cases based on the emptiness of the residual core.
1. If the residual core is not empty, the proposed strategy exhibits the
same similarity property: in equilibrium the core partition is proposed and
accepted, while residual cores form off-equilibrium.
The inductive assumption then ensures that the off-equilibrium path is
subgame-consistent so we only need to check whether a deviation Q˜ is ever
accepted. This deviation corresponds to a deviation in the partition function
game. Since (x∗,P∗) ∈ C(N,V ), by the construction of
(
Q(Q˜), xQ(Q˜)|xQ(Q˜)|
)
we know that for some history h(Q) there exists a player in Q˜ for whom
the deviation Q˜ is not profitable. Given the pessimism of the players, this
is sufficient to deter this player from accepting the proposal to deviate.
2. The emptiness of the residual core, by our assumption, implies that
there are no stationary consistent equilibrium strategy profiles. In the ab-
sence of such strategy profiles the strategy σ∗ will be abandoned and so
the players in Q˜ cannot predict the partition of Q – in this case, by Ex-
pression 4.1, they, individually, expect the worst. As Q˜ only forms if it is
a profitable deviation, that is, only if xi(σ
∗, h) is an improvement for all
h ∈ H(σ∗,Q,∅). Since (x∗,P∗) ∈ C(N,V ) this is not the case. This, im-
plies that post-deviation subgame is not relevant. Also, the formation of
15
P∗ is unaffected by possible deviations in this subgame, meeting the first
condition of subgame-consistency.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is by induction. The result holds for trivial,
single-player games. Assuming that the result holds for all k − 1 player
games, the result for k-player games is a corollary of Lemmata 2 & 3.
5 Applications
Our model is driven by externalities over the network: the idea that the
formation of a link has effects well beyond the nodes or players it connects —
not to be confused with network externalities or network effects describing
the phenomenon that the value of a product depends on the number of
people owning it.
Externalities are often characterised by the sign of the effect certain
actions have on others. As such, we may talk about positive externalities
when the formation of a link is generally of positive value to others, or about
negative externalities when the new link harms others. We will illustrate
both cases with a simple story. In the first, second-degree neighbours are of
importance and so friendships our friends make are beneficial to us, too. In
the second, connections our contacts make increase the risk of an infection,
thereby harming us.
5.1 Favour network
We consider an even simpler example of a network, where link formation
creates externalities and a wider cooperation can result in more efficient
outcomes.
We take the example of a favour network consisting of individuals who
maintain friendships at some cost c. For simplicity we assume that a friend-
ship is mutual, but the costs of maintaining the friendship are not necessarily
shared equally: in the usual TU fashion we envisage a complex system of
transfers of who buys which beer to maintain the network. Having many
friends is great, but now we are interested in friends’ friends. When a friend’s
friend is hiring and we want to apply for the job, the friend can put in a good
word for us. The same would not work if we would make direct contact as
praising ourselves is not so credible. Similarly, more distant relations may
have too little information about us. In sum, the benefit of the network is
the number of secondary friends a player has. Examples of such a network
include the referral network studied by Stupnytska and Zaharieva (2017). In
the following we formalise this rule, define the payoff function and determine
the emerging equilibrium network structures.
Let Ni = {j|j ∈ N, ∃l ∈ ` : e(l) = {i, j}} denote the neighbours of node
i and let N2i =
⋃
j∈Ni Nj \ {i} denote the secondary connections of i. Let
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di = |Ni| denote the degree of node i. Similarly, let d2i =
∣∣N2i ∣∣ denote the
secondary degree of node i. Note that the payoff does not depend on the
coalition structure. The payoff of coalition C embedded in partition P given
the network ` is
VC(`) =
∑
i∈C
(
d2i −
dic
2
)
. (5.1)
Note the absence of outside nodes.
We would like to know what is the core of this game.
Proposition 4. The core of the favour network game may only contain
efficient networks.
Proof. Since the payoff function does not depend on the partition of the
players, the game is cohesive, that is, the grand coalition can achieve any
configuration. If the network is not efficient, a deviation by the grand coali-
tion can strictly improve it and can strictly increase the payoff of each of
the players.
In the following we determine the efficient network structure. We discuss
three main cases:
Tree If the underlying network ` is a tree we show that it must be a star.
Assume that this is not the case and that i ∈ arg maxj dj . Moreover let k
be a leaf not connected to i, but to j. Since k is a leaf, d2k = dj − 1. Now
modify ` such that the link between j and k is moved to i and k. Since i
is still a leaf we get d
′2
k = d
′
i − 1 = di > dj − 1 = d2k, where the d′-s refer
to values in the modified network. Since no other indirect connections are
affected, the net gain is positive. Therefore all nodes must be connected to
the node with the highest degree resulting in a star.
Graph with triangles Now consider the case when the network is not a
tree. Firstly assume that the underlying graph ` contains triangles. Consider
a triangle T = {f, g, h}, such that, without loss of generality h ∈ arg maxi∈T .
We will show that the value of the network increases if we move the links
(except from those from f and h) pointing to g to h instead. To be more
precise: if there are such i that are not connected to h then the value of the
network can be increased. We discuss 5 cases.
Case 1: No complications Consider a node i such that ig ∈ `.
Moving this link from g to h the number of secondary contacts in T remain
the same: previously f and h, now f and g. On the other hand if we move
the similar links for all i ∈ Ng\T , the former secondary contacts via g remain
secondary contacts via h. Those in Nh\T are new secondary contacts, while
the number of links has not increased. If we have players outside T, the gain
is strictly positive.
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(a) The general case (b) i is already connected
(c) g secondary neigh-
bour (d) j connected to h (e) j = f
Figure 1: Improvements in graphs with triangles
Case 2: Already connected If some of these i nodes are already
connected to h there is no benefit to moving the links to h: while double
links are permitted by our formalism, in this example they bring no benefits.
In this case no links are shifted. If all such i nodes are connected to h then
the value cannot be increased, at least this way.
Case 3: g is already a secondary neighbour When g is already a
secondary neighbour moving the link to h loses h as a secondary neighbour,
but to no gain, as g is already in N2i . How is this possible? There exists j
with {i, j} , {g, j} ∈ `. But then following case 1 we move both links: as a
result we do lose both g and h as secondary links, but get them back both.
At the same time the benefits of Nh \ T as new connections still apply.
Case 4: j is already connected to h If j is already connected to
h we cannot move both links, but, like in Case 2, the link is already there
and so, if we wish, the roles of the links between {g, j} and {h, j} can be
switched.
Case 5: j = f It is perhaps useful to specially mention the case when
j = f . Actually, this case is no different from the rest. Of course, f is
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connected to both g and h, so we really have a special case of Case 4.
In a similar fashion we can move links to f to h, too. As a result triangles
are connected to the rest of the network via one of their vertices only.
Larger cycles Now we show that larger cycles cannot be part of an ef-
ficient network. For the moment assume that there are larger cycles, too.
Due to the previous result, the cycle may only share vertices and not arcs
with triangles. Consider the smallest cycle of length at least 4, C – this has
at least four nodes: let h, i, j and k nodes following each other on the cycle
and let h ∈ arg maxm∈C dm be one of the points with the highest degree in
the cycle. By the result that {h, i} is not part of a triangle, Nh and Ni are
disjoint. Then consider the following modification to the network: move the
arc linking j and k to link j and h. After the change j has dh+di secondary
neighbours, while before the change at most1 dk + di < dh + di. Therefore
if the graph has larger cycles, it can be made more efficient by creating a
triangle and thereby breaking the cycle. A repetition of this step eliminates
all cycles of length 4 or more.
After the elimination of large cycles, and following the recommended
improvements, we get a graph, which looks a bit like a tree, but with some
triangles attached to some vertices. Thanks to this similarity, we can im-
prove this graph similarly to the improvement applied for trees:
Select i ∈ arg maxj dj . With more than 2 players and a connected graph
we either do not have triangles or di > 2 in which case i cannot be one of
the non-connecting vertices (the f ’s and the g’s) of a triangle. Let f and
g such non-connecting vertices of a triangle T = {f, g, h}. Now modify the
graph so that fh and gh are moved to fi, gi. As before, by moving to a
node with a higher degree, both f and g have more secondary connections.
While the direct connections Nh \ {f, g} of h lose them, those in Ni gain
them and by assumption di ≥ dh.
Once we are done with the triangles, we have a node with many triangles
attached to it, but for the rest, the graph is just like a tree. So let k be a
leaf not connected to i, but to j. Since k is a leaf, d2k = dj − 1. Now modify
` such that the link between j and k is moved to i and k. Since i is still a
leaf we get d
′2
k = d
′
i − 1 = di > dj − 1 = d2k, where the d′-s refer to values
in the modified network. Since no other indirect connections are affected,
the net gain is positive. Therefore all nodes must be connected to the node
with the highest degree.
So far we have only looked at improvements that did not affect the num-
ber of direct connections, we merely rearranged them to have a more efficient
structure. As a result we have a player at the centre and all other n − 1
players are linked to it. Some of these outer players f, g are directly con-
nected. Such connections are never needed to have each other as secondary
1Note that i and k may have common neighbours.
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connections as this works via the central player. Outer links are used to
have the central player as a secondary connection. The added value of such
a link is therefore 4− c if neither f nor g is connected to other non-central
players, the value is 2 − c if one of them is connected and −c if both. For
high c these links are severed, for low values of c non-central players link up
in pairs, and if n is even (so that n − 1 is odd) the remaining non-central
player links to another only if c < 2. The links to the centre only break if
c > 2(n− 2).
(a) High c (b) Low c (c) Very low c
Figure 2: Efficient networks
Therefore if c > 2(n− 2) we get an empty network, for 2(n− 2) > c > 4
we get a star, for 4 > c we get a flower: if n is even, for c > 2 it has a stem,
otherwise a double petal.
Proposition 5. The core of the favour network game is empty.
Proof. The next question is stability. Consider a deviation by a single player
forming a singleton coalition. If this player forms or keeps no links, it has a
zero payoff. Let us see if it can have a higher payoff. Suppose it keeps a link
with its highest-degree neighbour. Since the residual game will be similar to
the original one, the players form a star or a flower. If so, it is always better
to form it “around” the player with the external link. Thereby the deviating
player becomes a peripheral player in a star with a payoff n − 2 − c2 . The
total value of a star is (n − 1)(n − 2) − (n − 1)c. Since the star is formed
by n players, there is a player with a payoff of at most (n−1)(n−2)−(n−1)cn ,
therefore the deviation is profitable if
n− 2− c
2
>
(n− 1)(n− 2)− (n− 1)c
n
This is satisfied when c > 2(n − 2), but we have not tested the stability of
the residual core. If it empty, the deviating player must expect the worst
of all possible reactions, including the one where links to it are broken and
therefore his payoff is 0. To check this, consider a more general case with k
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players deviating. It is easy to see that these players will all be peripheral
players who do not want to change the underlying network, only the distri-
bution of the payoffs, so that all these players will keep their links to the
central player and then efficient and therefore only possible reaction in the
residual game is a star around that player. The question is: will this player
keep the links to the deviated players. What causes the problems? While
the total value of the network does not change, the central player, by main-
taining the external links, subsidizes the deviated players more and more.
As the number of departed players increases the residual players’ benefit per
link to the deviating players decreases, while the associated costs remain the
same. The links remain profitable only if
n− k − 1 > c
2
where 0 < k < n. For some k this will be violated and then the deviations
are not profitable any more. Consider a deviation by k−1 peripheral players:
the residual core is nonempty and the deviation will be profitable. Therefore
the recursive core of this game is empty.
Note that this finding is driven by the fact that the central player must
sacrifice himself to the benefit of others: Normally others compensate him
for this, but selfish players may deviate and stop such transfers. In reality
such a central player has a very strong position and gets rewarded for the
favours he can provide. In the following example we make these rewards
explicit by assuming that, upon forming a link between players i and j,
player i must pay a transfer to j that is proportional to dj − 1. As a result,
a central player gets a high transfer, while a leaf gets nothing. Then the
payoff of coalition C embedded in partition P given the network ` is
VC(`) =
∑
i∈C
d2i − dic2 +
di(di − 1)−∑
j∈Ni
(dj − 1)
 t
 , (5.2)
where t < 1 is the compulsory transfer for using an intermediary.
Proposition 6. The core of the modified favour game is not empty if t is
sufficiently high t > c+22n .
Proof. Firstly observe that the modification merely introduces transfers
among players, so that the value of the grand coalition does not change.
In particular, the efficient structures remain the same. We may therefore
focus on the issue of stability. We limit our attention to star structures; the
case when c < 4 is similar.
Consider a star, and consider a deviation by k peripheral players. What
happens in the residual game? The former central player has already k
connections to the deviating players. Due to our assumptions that no new
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links may form between coalitions, no other player can have external links.
By linking to this player the remaining n − k − 1 players do not only get
a very high payoff, but they also increase the value of this central player’s
services to the deviating players. Formerly this was positive externality
they could not benefit from, but now the deviators must pay a fee for it.
So if the residual core is not empty, it keeps the pre-deviation structure.
Is this core non-empty? To see this, first compare the payoffs of players
in different positions (without the possible transfers within the coalition).
We will show that the central player earns more. To see this, observe the
following: What a player earns only depends on the network structure. The
network structure has not changed due to the deviations. At last: the
network, and the payoffs (recall we ignore transfers) are symmetric among
the peripheral players. Therefore if we show that the average payoff is higher
than the peripheral players’ payoff this shows the result.
A player on the periphery has a value n − 2 − (n − 2)t − c2 , while an
average player has (n−1)(n−2)−(n−1)cn . We want to show
n− 2− (n− 2)t− c
2
<
(n− 1)(n− 2)− (n− 1)c
n
(5.3)
c+ 2
2n
< t (5.4)
That is, if t is sufficiently large, the central player earns more. In such a
case the central player has no incentives to deviate and become a peripheral
player, while a player can only become central by cooperation with all other
players. This holds both in the original game and in the residual game, since
the underlying networks are the same.
5.2 Contagion network with social preferences
Our next application is motivated by the recent Covid-19 epidemic and
is a clear example of negative externalities. While various mathematical
models have been introduced to study the optimal response to an epidemic
(Parvin et al., 2012; Sharomi and Malik, 2017), our model takes the citizens’
perspective. The network models social contacts of individuals, where the
tradeoff is between the benefit of having friends and the risk of getting
infected. It is assumed that an individual may get infected by an involuntary
contact and may spread the infection to others in his or her social network.
This problem is rather different from other instances of bad networks. It
is not really related to the literature on dark or covert networks (Milward
and Raab, 2006; Husslage et al., 2013), where the nodes of the bad network
are aware of the fact that their contacts are bad and are contributing to the
maintenance of this network. In our model the network is a positive message
but carries the risk of spreading the disease. Even if only a small fraction
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of the population is infected, network results, known as the small world
phenomenon suggest that the social distance from infected people may be
smaller than what one would think (Vieira et al., 2010). Put it differently:
nodes do not know if they or their neighbours are infected and the threat is
near.
We use the notation of the previous subsection by letting di denote the
degree of node i. In addition we use d∞i to denote the number of nodes
connected to i: in other words the size of i’s component.
For a coalition C the payoff is
VC(`) =
∑
i∈C
(si(di)− d∞i ) , (5.5)
where si is a concave, weakly increasing function that we call player i’s so-
ciability function. The sociability function expresses the benefit from being
social, keeping in touch with people. We assume that the function is in-
creasing (the more, the merrier).At this point we are also very pragmatic
and assume that it is only the number of contacts that matters.
Expression VC(`) models the payoff from a long-term strategy of keep-
ing in touch with a chosen set of other players (and avoiding contact with
everyone else). At the same time people who contact the epidemic via in-
voluntary encounters will eventually spread the infection to everyone in the
same network component.
It is clear from looking at an individual’s payoff (coalition {i}) that
a typical player is either extremely social, wanting to keep in touch with
everyone or has a bound on the optimal number of connections where the
additional risk exceeds the benefit of seeing one more person. We will ignore
extremely social people or just assume that their bound is the number of
players.
In the following we present some simple results regarding this problem.
The first result is almost trivial.
Lemma 7. An core outcome has a network with fully connected components.
Proof. It is clear that each player benefits from having more contacts while
keeping the risk of infection at the same level. The network with fully con-
nected components can actually be obtained by a deviation by N partitioned
into coalitions corresponding to the components. The coalitions will con-
tinue to have no external connections but will build all internal links. No
player is harmed by the change so the deviation is profitable.
5.2.1 Homogeneous players
First we look at the case where si = sj for all i, j ∈ N . In this case all players
have the same bliss point. Let k denote this number of ideal neighbours,
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where the marginal benefit of an additional neighbour is less than the cost
of additional risk.
Consider a deviation by some coalition S forming partition S. Then each
coalition C ∈ S with |C| > k will severe all external links. To see this, we
construct a network that gives a higher payoff for the coalition. If there is a
player i with more than k neighbours including x outside C, then severing
ix increases the coalitional payoff. Now consider player j with less than k
neighbours, including y in N \ C. Since j has less than k neighbours, there
is also an h ∈ C, such that jh 6∈ `. Then the network, where jy is severed
and jh is created gives a higher payoff: the number of j’s neighbours does
not change, h′s increase, while n∞ stays or decreases for all in C. On the
other hand it may be that y ∈ C ′ ⊂ S is harmed. Notice, however that
as soon as C breaks all external links, it does not experience externalities
from other coalitions. In other words, if S can deviate profitably, then a
profitable deviation for {C} exists, where it separates itself from all other
players.
When k is the ideal number of neighbours, a player has the highest
payoff in a component with k+ 1 players, where he is connected to all other
members. In the symmetric case the same applies to all other members of
this component. Therefore we have the following observation.
Remark 1. The per-member payoff is the highest in a coalition corresponding
to a component with exactly k + 1 players.
Corollary 8. A deviation by a coalition of size k + 1 forming a fully con-
nected component is profitable if at least one of the members belongs to a
coalition of a different size.
Theorem 9. The core consists of a single outcome with the players parti-
tioned into fully connected components of size k+ 1 and each player getting
the same payoff.
Corollary 10. The core is nonempty if and only if |N | is divisible by k+ 1.
5.2.2 Heterogeneous players
Just as in the homogeneous case, each player i has an optimal number of
contacts ki. The following result is fairly trivial.
Lemma 11. If there exists a partition P of N such that each coalition S ∈ P
contains only players with optimal number |S| − 1 then the outcome where
the network consists of fully connected components according to P and each
player getting his own payoff is the only element of the core.
These conditions are rather special, it is generally not possible to group
players into such components. Consider the following, very simple example.
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Example 2. Consider a network with only 2 players, 0 and 1. Without loss
of generality s0(0) = s1(0) = 2.8, but s0(1) = 3 and s1(1) = 4. Clearly,
player 0 prefers to be solitary as the additional risk is higher than the
marginal benefit of keeping in touch with a friend. Therefore k0 = 0. On
the other hand, 1 is happy to be in touch with another player. Two network
structures are feasible corresponding to two singletons (`0) or a pair (`1).
Then v({0} , `0) = 2.8, v({1} , `0) = 2.8, while v(N, `1) = 3 + 4 − 2 = 5,
therefore the core network is segregated.
On the other hand, if the payoffs are somewhat different, s0(0) = s1(0) =
2.8, but s0(1) = 4 and s1(1) = 5, the payoffs of the singletons remain the
same, but the pair gets v(N, `1) = 4 + 5 − 2 = 7, therefore the more social
player can compensate the other and form a component of her ideal size.
It is good to see that a nonempty core does not require the extremely
rare structure required in Lemma 11: so an equilibrium network may contain
components containing heterogenous players. Do those components at least
contain similar players? In some sense, probably yes, but their preferred
component size is a poor indicator for that. A player with a very small
optimal size may have nearly the same benefit for every additional contact,
while another characterised by a larger k may get practically no benefit
from additional contacts. The second has a higher k value, but is very
difficult to compensate for the larger component, while the first prefers larger
components when these come with a little transfer.
Let ∆si(m) = si(m)− si(m− 1).
Theorem 12. Consider a player set N such that ∆s1(m) ≤ ∆s2(m) ≤
· · · ≤ ∆s|N |(m) for all m. Then if the core is not empty then there exists
a core outcome with a network that sorts players into components according
to their sociability function s.
Proof. There is a natural ordering of coalitions according to size. Players
with a low index prefer to be in small coalitions, while those with a large
index, in large coalitions. Now assume that the theorem is false. This means
that some social players ended up in small, and more introvert players in
large coalitions. Furthermore, there are two players in two neighbouring
coalitions of different sizes such that they are “mixed up”. Take this pair
and consider a deviation with the components as coalitions but two players
exchanged. Simple calculation shows that the deviation is profitable.
When there are multiple components of the same size, it does not matter
how the players are distributed resulting in additional — payoff-equivalent
— core outcomes.
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6 Remarks
We have introduced a rather general model to allow for coalitional improve-
ments in a network with possible transfers among coalition members. We
have used two very simple games, a favour network and a social network
with contagion to illustrate this model.
In the first version there was a tradeoff between direct costs and indirect
benefits, while in a second model players with many friends got transfers
in exchange of their services as intermediaries. While such transfers are
quite natural even in the settings of such personal connections, our model
fits rather well other situations. Consider the hub-and-spoke network of
air travel. There are natural differences: direct connections are the most
valuable, so let c denote the difference between the cost and the benefit of
the connections. The problem is not very interesting if the benefits exceed
the costs - we will have a complete network. On the other hand we see an
increasing cost of flights to major hubs. While technically it is not airports
paying transfers to others, minor airports heavily subsidise flights to major
destinations as it makes them attractive to travellers (Borenstein, 1989). Do
we see our model confirmed in real life? Yes, in the sense that our equilibrium
network structure is a hub and spoke network, but our example did not allow
for heterogeneity among the players or the emergence of transportation hubs
(Konishi, 2000). In real life popular hubs do not simply charge more, but
due to congestion adding new flights might become prohibitively costly or
even impossible due to capacity constraints, at lest in the short run. We
are still working on the problem with explicit capacity constraints, but it is
clear that the network will be less simple.
In our model players can, at a given, exogenous cost build a connection
for sure. Brueckner (2006) considers a friendship network where players
choose the effort level and the formation of a link is probabilistic, the higher
the effort (and the associated cost) the higher the probability that the link
forms. While our model is based on the assumption that coalitions have cer-
tain powers in building/severing links, the joint optimisation of connections
may still work in such a probabilistic setting.
Our model of the social network with the risk of contagion is based on the
experience and restrictions on social contacts employed in many countries
in relation to the Covid-19 epidemic that started in the end of 2019. Due to
the relatively long latence period before the infection one could get infected
by meeting a seemingly perfectly healthy person. As a precaution measure,
avoiding social contacts was recommended and various formal restrictions
have been introduced in various countries. These included complete curfew,
where one could only contact members of the household (by law) to less its
less formal versions. Our approach is motivated by New Zeeland’s social
bubble approach that allows people to interact with a small group of family
and friends while in lockdown. During the high alert phases of the epidemic
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the bubbles have been restricted to single households, but by mid April 2020,
as the threat of infection diminished, citizens were allowed to expand their
bubbles, “keep it exclusive, though and keep it small” (PM Jacinda Arden
on 16 April) — very much in line with the core networks balancing the need
to socialise with the infection risk.
These examples have been chosen for their simplicity. There are also
numerous other possible applications for this model. The balancing groups
in electric power networks (Csercsik and Ko´czy, 2017) rarely change but
such changes could also bring in new power line constructions. For the
natural gas pipeline network, the construction of the Nord Stream 2 (Sziklai
et al., 2018) is a prime example where a consortium backed by a coalition
of countries constructs a pipeline — followed by a reorganisation of the
complementary coalition including the construction of the Trans-Anatolian
and Trans-Adriatic Pipelines (TANAP and TAP). Sziklai et al. (2018) also
argue that the closure of an existing external connection, the Ukrainian
corridor may follow the construction.
We may also think of road infrastructure planning where regions act
as players (Wang and Zhang, 2017). Or a residential neighbourhood with
a trade-off between being accessible but not too central where stopping
through traffic by closing the central area may divert traffic to parallel routes
who may respond by similar measures. As a final example, the selling of
a subsidiary does not only mean that the internal processes are reorgan-
ised, but the entire supply chain must and does react to the new market
conditions.
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